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NEGATIVE BRIEF: End South China Sea Patrols

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Sailing for Stability

Michael Schuman 2016. (Writer about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China) “A South China Sea of Uncertainty.” June 10th, 2016. <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-06-10/why-you-need-to-care-about-the-south-china-sea/> (brackets added)

However, China's neighbors don't recognize its claims in the South China Sea. [Vietnam](http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/vietnam), [Malaysia](http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/malaysia), [the Philippines](http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/philippines), Taiwan and Brunei all forward their own territorial rights to parts of the sea. These countries see China's actions as an attempt to unilaterally assert its control. The U.S., meanwhile, has stepped in to support its allies, as well as what it considers freedom of navigation, and has repeatedly sent warships and planes into the disputed waters to uphold that right. [US Secretary of Defense, Ash] Carter, in [Singapore](http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/singapore), reiterated that the U.S. "will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, so that everyone in the region can do the same."

INHERENCY

New rules of engagement in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

China and the US agreed to rules that reduce risks for operations in China’s coastal EEZ

Bonnie S. Glaser 2015 (Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies) “Conflict in the South China Sea “ Apr 2015 <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377>

In addition, the risk of a dangerous incident involving U.S. and Chinese forces within China's EEZ remains a concern given the possibility of military escalation. Following several dangerous near-misses—notably in December 2013 involving a Chinese amphibious dock ship and a U.S. guided-missile cruiser and in August 2014 involving a Chinese fighter aircraft and a U.S. surveillance plane—the U.S. and Chinese militaries struck a groundbreaking deal on rules of behavior for safe military encounters between surface naval ships at sea. Such confidence-building measures may help reduce the potential for accidents in the future. However, individual commanders may still display aggressive behavior that could have dire consequences.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Current Policy is working - generally

US is upholding international law and deterring security threats to US allies

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

Existing U.S. policy is sensible, relatively comprehensive and proportionate to the U.S. interests involved. It is primarily diplomatic but not entirely so. It focuses on creating stability by exhorting all the parties to follow the rules of international law; it explicitly defines how Washington would like conflicts to be solved; and it includes hard-power initiatives aimed at redressing some of the power imbalance between the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. Finally, it incorporates an element of deterrence by not ignoring America’s security alliance with the Philippines as well as providing for access of U.S. naval and air forces in the Singapore and the Philippines.

1. Not promoting war

US policy isn’t trying to “roll back” China’s islands, just preserving the peace

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

This robust but realistic approach includes accepting the fundamental reality that we will not roll back China’s existing occupation of islands and other features, just as we will not accept its rolling back its neighbors’ occupation of other islands and features. Most fundamentally, the United States must preserve peace and a stable status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted by history.

Shouldn’t retreat: US naval patrols are maintaining peace in the region

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

As Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the way forward for the United States is clear: Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. Together with the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, on which the international system depends to operate effectively and equitably. Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the South China Sea alone. We cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these international waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors face bullying without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself terms “democracy” or “democratization in international relations.” Instead, we must maintain the national will and force structure to continue to operate in, under, and over the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas and preserve them as peaceful parts of the global commons for all to use without fear.

No war risk: US military can maintain peace and deter Chinese aggression on the island and maritime claims

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Let me underscore once again that the United States and China can avoid war. I’m confident that we will avoid fighting each other. Rather, this is about maintaining robust deterrence in peacetime and in any crises that might erupt. Specifically, we must deter Beijing from attempting to resolve island or maritime claims disputes with the use of force, or even the threat of force. The aforementioned [U.S.] weapons systems, effectively deployed and combined with a broader strategy, can repeatedly convince China’s leaders that they will not succeed in their objective if they attempt to use military force to seize additional features and waters around them, or to prevent U.S. forces from operating in international waters and airspace nearby

US military presence key to deterrence. Turn: We should even try to increase our capabilities in the region

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

In addition to cooperation and capacity building with regional allies and partners, the United States must maintain robust deterrence that paces China’s growing arsenal of counterintervention weapons. Here, unfortunately, Washington continues to suffer lingering effects from the mishandling of the Iraq War and its aftermath. Among other problems, a decade of land wars with unclear, unrealistic objectives diverted attention and resources from capabilities to preserve the ability of the U.S. military to operate in maritime East Asia even while threatened by Chinese systems. Washington is finally devoting increased attention to several types of weapons with particular potential to demonstrate that counterintervention won’t work, but existing efforts may still be too slow and limited to arrest an emerging gap between U.S. goals and capabilities.

1. No imminent crisis of US/China friction

Drastic Measures Unneeded – the US and China aren’t on the brink of war

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

As invoked by none other than Xi Jinping himself to pressure US counterparts, as well as by influential Chinese public intellectuals to call for US concessions, the idea of the imperative to avoid a “Thucydides trap” represents a misapplication of history. It falsely implies that only by taking drastic measures can the United States and China avoid previous patterns of ruinous conflict between an established power and a rising power. The product of a time that human progress over the past century has finally rendered obsolete, Thucydides offers a cynical, outdated interpretation that has no place in American values, or the world that the United States seeks to promote: “The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must.” I’m confident that’s not the kind of world we’re here to promote today.

We must accept friction, not run away from it: Current friction is manageable

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Here, given China’s growing power and our own sustained power and resolve, we must accept a zone of bounded strategic friction and contestation. Such friction is manageable, and we must manage it. To do so effectively, we should develop the mind-set that we are in a great power relationship wherein we need to act to protect our vital interests and support the global system even as China is working to promote its own vital interests. It means preparing to live in the same strategic space together, with overlapping vital interests. This is the essence of great power relations, reflecting a reversion to historical norms after the brief and unsustainable unipolar moment is over—even as the United States remains strong as the world’s leading power, and the world remains far from being a true “multipolar” system

Regional Concern

Ashton Carter 2016. (United States Defense Secretary, reported through the Washington Post). “U.S. ramps up military presence in Philippines, starts joint patrols in South China Sea” April 14th, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-ramps-up-military-in-philippines-starts-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea/2016/04/14/5f312bc9-4cf8-4c44-902c-9a2861cc5386_story.html>

“Countries across the Asia-Pacific are voicing concern with China’s land reclamation, which stands out in size and scope, as well as its militarization in the South China Sea,” Carter told reporters, according to Reuters news agency. Carter said he will be visiting the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis in the South China Sea on Friday.

SOLVENCY

1. Negotiations won’t solve: issues are too complicated

Spratly Islands dispute can’t be settled by any kind of arbitration – it’s too complicated

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

Rosen raises an important point when he writes, “It is unlikely that any court would ever award a single country title to all of the disputed features in the Spratlys.” Is it possible to claim sovereignty over the 140-odd islets, rocks, reefs, shoals, and sand banks above water at high tide that are spread over some 164,000 square miles of ocean, based on a handful of acts of occupation? In other words, would a court or arbitral body be willing to consider the Spratlys as a single territorial unit, or, because of the island group’s sprawl and remoteness, could other acts of discovery and occupation by other, faraway countries be legitimate? In short, would arbitration have to be addressed feature by feature?

2. Negotiations won’t solve: China refuses to cooperate

China will not abide by international law on disputes over law of the sea

Frauke Renz 2016 (*Visiting Researcher at Georgetown Law as well as Non-Resident Pacific Forum CSIS WSD-Handa Fellow and is pursuing her PhD in International Law*) 7 June 2016 NATIONAL INTEREST “Philippines vs. China: A Chinese Loss Won't Kill International Law” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/phillippines-v-china-chinese-loss-wont-kill-international-16487> (brackets added)

Clearly, there are vastly differing views concerning the role of international legal proceedings.  On the one hand, as stated by the Philippine Foreign Secretary del Rosario, the[dispute resolution mechanisms](http://globalnation.inquirer.net/125726/full-text-dfa-sec-albert-del-rosarios-speech-at-un-tribunal) provided for by UNCLOS [UN Convention on Law of the Sea] “allow the weak to challenge the powerful on an equal footing.” On the other hand, prominent Chinese scholar Wu Shicun argued that the arbitral case actually could[exacerbate existing tensions](http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-south-china-sea-arbitration-case-could-exacerbate-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea/). Furthermore, China already stated that it would not adhere to the decision made by the tribunal as it[does not accept its jurisdiction](http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/05/12/hague-rs-gonna-hague-beijing-amps-up-opposition-to-south-china-sea-tribunal/).

DISADVANTAGES

1. Destabilized Region

Link: China is militarizing the Spratly and Paracel Islands

Simon Denyer 2016. (Washington Post Bureau Chief in China). “U.S. ramps up military presence in Philippines, starts joint patrols in South China Sea.” April 14th, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-ramps-up-military-in-philippines-starts-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea/2016/04/14/5f312bc9-4cf8-4c44-902c-9a2861cc5386_story.html>

China has built airstrips and appears to be building a sophisticated military radar system in the Spratlys. It also stationed surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets in the Paracel Islands — a separate chain over which China has enjoyed full control since a 1974 naval battle with Vietnam but whose sovereignty Hanoi still bitterly contests.

Link: Lost US capability, or even the perception of it, gravely threatens regional stability

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

As for substantive efforts, we must develop and maintain a force structure and set of supporting policies and partnerships geared to ensuring access despite Chinese development of counterintervention capabilities. Even maintaining mutual deterrence vis-à-vis China could be good enough for the United States— Washington’s key objective is to prevent the use, or threat, of force to resolve regional disputes. But allowing even the perception that such ability to “hold the ring” has eroded could gravely threaten the stability of a vibrant yet vulnerable region.

Brink: Reducing American resolve will make things worse

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

As bad as things are already, they could get worse—particularly if American attention and resolve are in question. In attempting to prevent China from using military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the South China Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijing’s three-pronged trident designed precisely to preserve such a possibility. Maritime militia and coast guard forces will be forward deployed, possibly enveloping disputed features as part of a “Cabbage Strategy” that dares the US military to use force against nonmilitary personnel. Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that includes both China’s navy and its “anti-navy” of land-based antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD), or “counterintervention,”\* forces, collectively deploying the world’s largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only Vietnam also has a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not positioned to oppose China’s. Meanwhile, China’s coast guard is already larger than those of all its neighbors combined, and still growing rapidly.

Brink: US withdrawal is a game changer

Robert D. Kaplan 2016. (Author on American foreign affairs. His work has appeared in The Atlantic. The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal amongst other news agencies. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security). “The South China Sea will be the battleground of the future.” February 2nd, 2016. <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2>

“Plan B is the U.S. Navy—Pacific Command. But we will publicly remain neutral in any U.S.-China dispute.” To make certain that I got the message, this official said: “An American military presence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.” The withdrawal of even one U.S. aircraft carrier strike group from the Western Pacific is a “game changer.”

Link & Brink: China / Philippines dispute could drag US into fight with China because of US treaty with the Philippines

Bonnie S. Glaser 2015 (Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies) “Conflict in the South China Sea “ Apr 2015 <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377>

The dispute between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal deserves immediate attention. Since 1999, a small contingent of Philippine marines has been deployed on a vessel that Manila beached on the submerged reef. In 2014, Chinese coast guard ships attempted unsuccessfully to block delivery of food, water, and fresh troops to the military outpost. The condition of the beached ship is rapidly deteriorating and it is expected to slide into the sea in a matter of months unless it is reinforced. This situation could lead to another confrontation between Chinese and Philippine forces should Beijing decide to seize the shoal. The U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty could be invoked if, for example, a Philippine naval or coast guard vessel is attacked, a Philippine military aircraft is shot down, or members of the Philippine armed forces are injured.

Impact: War with China = Political, economic and military disaster

Abraham Denmark 2015 (senior vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research; quoted by journalist Peter Rugh) 6 Feb 2015 “We Asked a Military Expert What Would Happen if the US Went to War with China” <http://www.vice.com/read/we-asked-a-military-expert-what-would-happen-if-the-us-went-to-war-with-china>

A conflict between China and the US of any significance would be disastrous for both sides—politically, economically, and militarily. It's something both sides have a profound interest in avoiding. The Chinese would have to take very seriously the implications of entering into a conflict with the US military. The US military is by far the most capable military that has ever been seen in human civilization. A war is not something to be taken on lightly. From an American point of view, our objectives are always to reduce tension, avoid conflict, and reduce the potential for miscalculation.

1. Trade Disruption

Link: Trillions of dollars of trade passes through the South China Sea

Everett Rosenfeld 2014 (Staff writer at CNBC) “Chinese naval push could affect global trade.” August 29th, 2014. <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/china-vietnam-philippines-conflict-in-south-china-sea-could-wreck-the-economy.html>

The U.S. Commerce Department estimated that the United States exported $79 billion in goods to the countries around the South China Sea in 2013, and imported $127 billion from them that year. Including goods simply passing through, Navy Adm. Robert Willard estimated in 2011 that the region accounts for $5.3 trillion in bilateral annual trade—of which $1.2 trillion is U.S. trade

Link: South China Sea is a massive trade network

Robert D. Kaplan 2016. (Author on American foreign affairs. His work has appeared in The Atlantic. The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal amongst other news agencies. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security). “The South China Sea will be the battleground of the future.” February 2nd, 2016. <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2>

The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans — the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce. Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide.

Link: Widespread fear that China will impede shipping trade

Michael Schuman 2016. (Writer about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China) “A South China Sea of Uncertainty.” June 10th, 2016. <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-06-10/why-you-need-to-care-about-the-south-china-sea>

All parties have reason to dig in. The South China Sea is a major thoroughfare of commerce – some [$5.3 trillion in trade](http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883) passes through each year – and the U.S. and its allies fear China might try to impede this critical shipping. There is also speculation that there are significant resources of natural gas and oil still [untapped in the sea](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS), which could be exploited by whichever nation can assert its claims.

Impact: Substantial Global Economic Damage

Everett Rosenfeld 2014 (Staff writer at CNBC) “Chinese naval push could affect global trade.” August 29th, 2014. <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/china-vietnam-philippines-conflict-in-south-china-sea-could-wreck-the-economy.html>

One such risk is that if a flare-up were to arise between China and one of its smaller neighbors, those global trade routes could be affected, hurting the world economy, Dutton said. "The impact of a disruption for even a period of three weeks would be substantial," he said, adding that he did not consider any outright conflict in the region to be especially likely, although the possibility remains.

Impact: Global trade costs would go up

Michael Schuman 2016. (Writer about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China) “A South China Sea of Uncertainty.” June 10th, 2016. <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-06-10/why-you-need-to-care-about-the-south-china-sea>

"Our concern becomes that China, because it defines its rights broadly to control areas under its maritime jurisdiction, reserves for itself the right to ban foreign military movement," Dutton said. If this were to occur, other countries may begin to enforce similar principles. The entire system of global trade would consequently become more costly because the presence of strong, oftentimes Western, navies "tends to dampen disruption," and China's navy isn't strong enough to police the region on its own, Dutton said.

Impact: Global economy could be affected by any conflict in the South China Sea

Everett Rosenfeld 2014 (Staff writer at CNBC) “Chinese naval push could affect global trade.” August 29th, 2014. <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/china-vietnam-philippines-conflict-in-south-china-sea-could-wreck-the-economy.html>

Tensions in the South China Sea—scene of naval standoffs in the past year as China has pressed its smaller neighbors on the open sea—may seem far off to many Western investors, but any conflict in the region could affect the global economy.

Impact: Trade impact makes South China Sea “Vital Interest” to the United States

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

During testimony before the Senate in 2012, then secretary of state Hillary Clinton made the point that the first, of the aforementioned aspects of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a “vital interest.” Data tend to support this claim. More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Strait of Malacca, and the Indonesian Straits of Sunda, and Lombok. These straits link the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, and most of that maritime traffic is either coming from or going onward through the South China Sea. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global LNG trade passes through the South China Sea, making it one of the most important trade routes in the world. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2011 estimated that 8.4 billion

1. Alliances Damaged

Link/Brink: Stopping Chinese bullying is a key test of US reliability to regional allies

Michael Schuman 2016. (Writer about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China) “A South China Sea of Uncertainty.” June 10th, 2016. <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-06-10/why-you-need-to-care-about-the-south-china-sea>

Yes, the details may sound pointless, but the point behind them is critical. The South China Sea has become the premier test of America's ability to preserve its primary security role in Asia, and prove to its allies in the region that the U.S. can contend with the challenge posed by an assertive Communist China gaining in wealth and power. From Washington’s perspective, allowing China to bully its way to dominance in the sea would undermine the norms of international relations the U.S. has instituted since the end of World War II.

Link: Regional Allies Desire Assistance. Example: Philippines

Simon Denyer 2016. (Washington Post Bureau Chief in China). “U.S. ramps up military presence in Philippines, starts joint patrols in South China Sea.” April 14th, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-ramps-up-military-in-philippines-starts-joint-patrols-in-south-china-sea/2016/04/14/5f312bc9-4cf8-4c44-902c-9a2861cc5386_story.html>

The Philippine government worries that China could begin a new program of land reclamation and building on the shoal, which lies 145 miles west of the Philippines and 620 miles from the Chinese coast. The Philippines’ ambassador to Washington, Jose L. Cuisia Jr., recently appealed for U.S. help to block any Chinese expansion.

Backup Link: Chinese military power expands as a direct challenge to US alliances

Liselotte Odgaard, 2015. (associate professor at the Royal Danish Defense College). “China’s Dangerous Ambiguity in the South China Sea.” December 10th, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/opinion/chinas-dangerous-ambiguity.html?_r=0>

China’s policy of ambiguity leads to one conclusion: Beijing wants to expand its military presence in the South China Sea as a direct challenge to the U.S. alliance system because to do so would allow China to interfere with the free movement of military vessels and aircraft.

Backup Link: Other countries look to U.S. for support against China

Michael Schuman 2016. (Writer about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China) “A South China Sea of Uncertainty.” June 10th, 2016. <http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-06-10/why-you-need-to-care-about-the-south-china-sea>

The U.S., too, has little incentive to back down. More countries in the region are looking to Washington for support against Chinese encroachment. During President Barack Obama's May visit to Vietnam, [he lifted a long-standing ban](http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-05-23/obama-lifts-decades-old-arms-ban-in-his-1st-visit-to-vietnam) on the sale of weaponry to the country, a clear sign of how the two one-time adversaries are growing closer together.

US Commitment Brink: US commitment to the South China Sea tests its Asian alliances

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

In short, since the start of President Obama’s second term in 2013, the administration has been very active in trying to reassure U.S. allies and friends that the United States remains serious regarding its role as a force for stability in Asia. Strategically, whether the administration intended it or not, the South China Sea has evolved into an important litmus test of its “rebalance to Asia” strategy.

China Expansion Brink: Continuing active US engagement in the S. China Sea is key to preventing a power vacuum

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

The United States has a critical interest in providing reassurance to its allies and partners in the region that it will maintain a strong security presence to prevent a power vacuum from developing as China rises. That requires a continuing active engagement in the South China Sea, taking steps that encourage responsible behavior and discouraging coercion by all parties.

Impact: Chinese bullying of our allies is dangerous. Leads to increased risk of war and loss of economic prosperity

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

More broadly, worries about China’s island construction, developing force posture in the South China Sea, and accompanying official statements exemplify broader foreign concern about China’s rise—that as it becomes increasingly powerful, Beijing will   
• Abandon previous restraint in word and deed   
• Bully its smaller neighbors   
• Implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to resolve disputes  
• Attempt to change—or else run roughshod over—important international norms that preserve peace in Asia and underwrite the global system on which mutual prosperity depends

Impact: Strong US/Japan alliance is key to prosperity and success of the Asia-Pacific region

Ian Easton, Randall Schriver, and Sabrina Tsai 2014. (Easton – master’s degree in China studies; research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank where he conducts research on defense and security issues involving the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. Schriver - founding partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Tsai - research associate at the Project 2049 Institute, where she conducts research and monitors U. S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region) THE ALLIANCE - TOWARD A STRONGER U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP 18 July 2014 <http://www.project2049.net/documents/US_Japan_SPF_Capstone_Paper_2014.pdf>

The most important aspect of Japan’s national security strategy is its defensive alliance with the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. security commitment to Japan has served as an anchor stabilizing the region and enabling growth. The stunning political and economic transformation of post-war Japan created the world’s second most prosperous country after the United States and a model for other aspiring regional powers to follow. Arguably, democracy and prosperity would not have flourished in South Korea and Taiwan in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong would not enjoy their current standards of living; and China would not be an emerging great power. In ways large and small the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as a pillar supporting the dramatic rise of the Asia-Pacific on the world stage.

4. Taiwan Takeover

Link: China has a long-term strategy to take over the virtually all of the South China Sea

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unreciprocated restraint But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vision of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of the South China Sea.

Link & Brink: US naval patrols are key to deterring Chinese actions in the S. China Sea

Truong-Minh Vu and Ngo Di Lan 2016. (Vu is the Director of the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City. Ngo Di Lan is a PhD student in Politics at Brandeis University, where he focuses on U.S foreign policy and U.S-China relations.) April 7th, 2016. <http://amti.csis.org/flexible-response-deter-south-china-sea/>

To stop China from continuing to change the status quo in the South China Sea and militarize the dispute, the United States must be able to deter effectively. And ultimately, the greatest value of flexible response lies in its ability to send an unambiguous deterrence signal to China. As long as U.S. responses rely on actions with a primary purpose other than deterrence, such as joint exercises and freedom of navigation operations, it is not able to send a message of resolve to China because it suggests Washington is not ready to bear the costs of directly confronting China’s actions.

Link: Taiwan threat. Chinese island-building is part of a plan to use force to take over Taiwan – if the U.S. will allow it

Joseph A. Bosco 2016 (worked in the office of the US Secretary of Defense 2002-2010) “Six Little Words That Keep the South China Sea Hanging in the Balance” NATIONAL INTEREST 3 Aug 2016 <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-little-words-keep-the-south-china-sea-hanging-the-17236>

So Beijing faces a decision—can it employ force against Taiwan without risking U.S. intervention? Have “the circumstances” changed enough since 1995 to dissuade Washington from responding militarily? Politically, Taiwan’s democratic development has advanced dramatically through six direct presidential elections and three peaceful transfers of power, reflecting shared values that have only drawn America closer to Taiwan. Yet that deepening democracy is also the source of even greater Chinese Communist resentment, anxiety and impatience. The demographic trends clearly work against Beijing’s ambitions. But the military situation has also evolved dramatically—this time in China’s favor. Beijing’s hard-liners are convinced they are changing “the circumstances,” affecting the United States’ will to intervene with every new attack submarine they build and every additional antiship missile they deploy in their anti-access/area denial strategy to keep the United States out. They are also justified in believing that their much maligned island building and aggressive maritime claims—while earning China international opprobrium, culminating in the arbitral tribunal’s decision in favor of the Philippines—is nonetheless gaining them strategic advantages vis-à-vis the United States.

Brink: Chinese militarization of artificial islands is a “tipping point” that requires US response to block Chinese threat

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned Chinese activities as a “tipping point,” meriting US government response. “Militarization of the newly constructed islands,” which China appears determined to do, will, he argues cogently, alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. “It will turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based power.” This is part of a “regional maritime strategy to expand China’s interior to cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental control.

Impact: Losing Taiwan = U.S. strategic national security disaster.

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) *“Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii. To avoid that fate, Washington must reiterate that the future of Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. It must deploy sufficient naval and air forces in the western Pacific to deter Chinese aggression, initiate high-level military exchanges with Taiwan to facilitate joint military planning, and speed up the sale to Taiwan of F-16 fighters and other weapons that would be useful in resisting a Chinese invasion.

Link + Impact: Won’t stop with Taiwan. China would continue aggression after they take Taiwan

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker & Bonnie Glaser 2011 (Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum) Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? WASHINGTON QUARTERLY <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf>

Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, is still difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability. Accordingly, a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need.

A/T “China doesn’t have the capability to invade Taiwan” – They soon will.

Prof. Charles L. Glaser 2015. (*Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ* ) A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2015 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf>

China’s improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time.

5. Chinese militarization

Link: Chinese island building expands China’s military capabilities

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx> (brackets in original)

That brings us to recent events, which I believe have precipitated today’s hearing—and rightly so. In 2014, China greatly accelerated what had long been a very modest process of “island building,” developing land features in the Spratlys and Paracels on a scale and [with a] sophistication that its neighbors simply cannot match, even collectively over time. “Features” is the key word here, because many were previously small rocks or reefs not legally considered “islands.” Then China used some of the world’s largest dredgers to build up some of the most pristine coral reefs above water with thousands of tons of sand, coral cuttings, and concrete. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Harry Harris aptly terms China’s creation a “Great Wall of Sand.” It has created over two thousand acres of “land” where none remained above South China Sea waters before. But it’s what China is constructing atop this artificial edifice that most concerns its neighbors and the United States: militarily relevant facilities, including at least two runways capable of serving a wide range of military aircraft, that could allow Beijing to exert increasing influence over the South China Sea.

Link: China admits to militarization of South China Sea

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Beijing itself has stated officially that there will be military uses for the new “islands” it has raised from the sea. On 9 March 2015, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that Spratly garrison “maintenance and construction work” was intended in part for “better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” Hua elaborated that construction was designed in part to “satisfy the necessary military defense needs.” Chinese military sources employ similar wording.

Link: Islands could lead to advanced military systems

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Then-commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear’s 15 April 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee supports this assessment: In addition to basing Chinese coast guard ships to expand influence over a contested area, “expanded land features down there also could eventually lead to the deployment of things, such as long-range radars, military and advanced missile systems.” Locklear added: “It might be a platform for them, if they ever wanted to establish an ADIZ [air defense identification zone] for them to be able to enforce that from.

Link: Runways are not designed solely for civilian use

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Airstrips . . . and ADIZ? For airstrips, after structural integrity, it’s length that matters most.There’s no need for a three-thousand-meter runway (as China now has on Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef ) to support evacuation of personnel for medical or weather emergencies via turboprop and other civilian aircraft. Such a runway is only needed to support a full range of military options. Building a separate taxiway alongside, as China has already done at Fiery Cross Reef, suggests plans for high-tempo, high-sortie-rate military operations. No other South China Sea claimant enjoys even one runway of this caliber on any of the features that it occupies.

Impact: High risk of war. Chinese naval capabilities, if not deterred, will disrupt peace and stability

William Lowther 2015 (journalist) US analyst urges Japan to sell Taiwan submarines, TAIPEI TIMES 7 Feb 2015 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/02/07/2003611010> (brackets added)

Mazza’s study followed testimony by US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall before a hearing of the US House Armed Services Committee that China’s military modernization had undermined US superiority. “We’re at risk and the situation is getting worse,” Kendall said. Earlier this week, the former intelligence chief of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Captain James Fanell, said in Honolulu that Beijing was “rejuvenating” and preparing for a military conflict. “China’s rise, if left unchecked or undeterred, will necessarily disrupt the peace and stability of our friends, partners and allies,” Fanell told the Washington Free Beacon Web site.

Impact: Chinese militarization increases risk of nuclear attack on the US homeland

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) *“Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance -- managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism -- as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

6. International law on freedom of navigation violated

Link: Ambiguous Chinese Claims – the 9-dash line

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Despite all its rhetoric, actions, developmental efforts, and apparent preparations, however, China has repeatedly declined to disclose the precise basis for, the precise nature of, or even the precise geographical parameters of its South China Sea claims. As the US Office of Naval Intelligence documents, China “has never published the coordinates of the “nine-dash line” that it draws around virtually the entire South China Sea—perilously close to the coasts of its neighbors, all of whom it has disputes with. It has not “declared what rights it purports to enjoy in this area.” Beijing still has not specified whether or not it considers the South China Sea to constitute a “core interest.” Given China’s statements and actions to date, however, there is reason for concern that it is determined to maintain expansive claims based on unyielding invocation of the “nine-dash line.”

Link: China makes claims of maritime zones that are contrary to international law

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute; serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

China’s record on maritime sovereignty fuels this concern. The vast majority of nations agree that under international law a country with a coastline controls only economic resources in waters twelve to two hundred nautical miles out— and even less if facing a neighbor’s coast less than four hundred nautical miles away. But China additionally claims rights to control military activities in that exclusive economic zone, as well as, apparently, in the airspace above it.

Link: Freedom of Navigation requires American Military Power

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

Proper efforts in the abovementioned areas will thereby support access to pursue our vital interests, which include unfettered access to all areas of operation allowed by international law. This access is not only in the form of freedom of navigation per se, but also to support a much broader set of fundamentals: access for American military force, economic power, political persuasion, and influence over regional events. All require the support of military power that underwrites American influence on behalf of the global system.

Link: “Slicing the Salami” –China taking incremental steps that chip away at the rules - has been effective thus far

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt 2014. (US Navy (Ret.) is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a vice president and now as a fellow, he has had a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia published.) “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future.” November 2014. <https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf>

Over the last two years, China’s approach in the South China Sea has been characterized as a “salami slice” strategy: it continues to take small, incremental steps that are not likely to provoke a military response from any of the other claimants, but over time gradually change the status-quo regarding disputed claims in its favor. Some Chinese have unofficially referred to this as a “cabbage” approach—referring to the layer-by-layer way in which an occupied feature is surrounded. Whatever one calls it, the strategy has been very effective.

Link & Brink: US needs to take action now to block further Chinese violations of international norms

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson 2015. (Associate professor in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the *Naval War College Review*’s Editorial Board.) “AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA” Presented in a Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015. <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9bb6b27b-509c-44c9-bd32-8967632939ee/Americas-Security-Role-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx>

China’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and influence.

Impact: Global peace & prosperity threatened

Tara Murphy 2010 (masters degree in Security Studies; fellow with the Defense and National Security Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies) YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS “ Security Challenges in the 21st Century Global Commons” <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105205murphy.pdf>

The development and proliferation of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) tech­nologies to an increasing number of states, including potential U.S. adversar­ies, presents U.S. leaders with what military strategist Andrew Krepinevich calls, “a strategic choice of the first magnitude.” Namely, U.S. leaders must decide to either change the way the United States does business or surrender the ability to project power worldwide. These power projection capabilities underpin the openness of the global commons. Krepinevich argues, “While generally underappreciated, the U.S. military’s role as the steward of the global commons—the world’s oceans in particular—has enabled the free movement of goods around the world, facilitating both general peace and prosperity.” Thus, challenges to U.S. power projection capabilities in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains directly threaten the openness of the global commons.